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Tort Law-EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES AND RESULTING PHYSICAL INJURIES
OCCASIONED BY NEGLIGENCE-Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214
(1973).
The early decisions involving negligently inflicted emotional distress and
resulting physical injuries generally held that a contemporaneous physical
impact was a prerequisite to a right of recovery.' This requirement, com-
monly referred to as the "impact rule,"'2 has today been rejected or abro-
gated in most American jurisdictions.' The status of this rule in Virginia
has been unclear since the decision of Bowles v. May4 because of conflicting
1. Both England and America adopted the "impact rule" at approximately the same time
in the landmark decisions of Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (Can. 1888)
and Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Victorian announced three
basic reasons for their holding. First, damages unaccompanied by actual physical injury
cannot be considered as a natural result of negligence. Secondly, recovery in such cases would
open the field for imaginary claims. Finally, there was no precedent of a similar action having
been maintained. Mitchell based their decision on the following reasons. First, since recovery
for emotional disturbance is not permitted, resulting physical injuries do not afford a basis
for recovery. Secondly, recovery would precipitate a flood of litigation. Finally, the door would
be opened to feigned claims. Despite the fact that England abandoned the rule thirteen years
later in Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, the "impact rule" had gained favor in
the majority of American jurisdictions. See Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898);
Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202,47 N.E. 694 (1897); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R.,
168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899);
Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900). Contra, Purcell v. St. Paul
City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
2. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 31, 32, 33, 197 S.E.2d 214, 217, 218 (1973).
3. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 331 n.64 (4th ed. 1971), listing
the jurisdictions which still require a contemporaneous physical impact:
[T]he following jurisdictions so hold: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia (doubtful), Washington. Florida
allows recovery without impact where the defendant's conduct is wanton or malicious,
but not otherwise.
But see Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (removing Florida);
Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (removing Michigan); Hughes v.
Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973) (removing Virginia). It appears that only nine
jurisdictions still require impact, and only one of the remaining nine have considered the rule
since 1929. Comment, Injuries from Fright Without Contact, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 331, 337
(1966).
4. 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932). In this case plaintiff was denied recovery when she
suffered a stroke of paralysis and speech impediments allegedly occasioned by defendant's
threats to sue and accusation that plaintiff had made criminal libelous statements and that
he intended to see that she went to jail. The confusion apparently results from the language
of the court and their disposition of the case.
[lin Virginia . . .there can be no recovery for mental anguish and suffering resulting
from negligence unaccompanied by contemporaneous physical injuries . . . .Id. at
433, 166 S.E. at 555.
Later the opinion stated:
While the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions should not bar recovery
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interpretations. 5
In Hughes v. Moore6 the Virginia Supreme Court resolved this conflict.
Action was brought to recover for physical disorders allegedly sustained as
a direct consequence of fright and shock, 7 occasioned when defendant's
automobile struck plaintiff's porch. Plaintiff was standing in a doorway
between her living room and kitchen when she heard the crash and saw
headlights shining through her front window. She became very nervous
and was unable to breast-feed her three-month-old baby due to her "di-
minishing breasts," 8 and her menstrual period started?
Affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court ruled that a right of
recovery exists for "physical injuries" sustained as a natural result of fright
and shock, proximately caused by the defendant's negligent conduct.10
Certain limitations were imposed upon this holding. First, recovery is lim-
ited to cases in which a person of ordinary sensibilities would have been
affected under the circumstances, unless the defendant had specific knowl-
edge of a plaintiff's peculiar sensibilities." Secondly, this holding is not
in a meritorious case, nevertheless, because of the fact that fright or mental shock may
be so easily feigned without detection, the court should allow no recovery in a doubtful
case. Id. at 438, 166 S.E. at 557.
5. Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947, 949-50 (E.D. Va. 1960), interpreted Bowles as permit-
ting recovery notwithstanding the absence of a physical impact and concluded that recovery
in Bowles was denied on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. But see Ferrell v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. Emp. Hosp. Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Va. 1971); Soldinger v. United
States, 247 F. Supp. 559, 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
6. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973) (Harrison, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216. Dr. Nelson, a psychiatrist, was "of the opinion that there
was a 'causal connection' between the automobile striking plaintiff's home and her emotional
and physical condition."
8. Id. at 28-29, 197 S.E.2d at 215-16. Dr. Gabriel, plaintiff's family physician, prescribed
hormones, but apparently they were ineffective since plaintiff testified that some two years
later her breasts were smaller thdn their normal size.
9. Id. at 28-29, 197 S.E.2d at 215. "Her menstrual period had begun, which is not normal
for a mother during the period of nursing her child, and the flow was excessive."
10. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
We hold, . . . that where the claim is for emotional disturbance and physical injury
resulting therefrom, there may be recovery for negligent conduct, notwithstanding the
lack of physical impact, provided the injured party properly pleads and proves by clear
and convincing evidence that his physical injury was the natural result of fright or
shock proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
11. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. This is the prevailing view in America. See 38 Ari. JUR. 2d
Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 27 & n.18 (1968). Several jurisdictions, however,
have followed the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965):
The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical
condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known to the actor makes
the injury greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen
as a probable result of his conduct. Id.
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intended to permit recovery in cases involving the witnessing of negligently
inflicted injuries to third persons."2
The traditional arguments advanced by the proponents of the "impact
rule" were rejected by the court in the following manner. Medical science
has minimized the difficulty of finding a causal relationship between the
injury sustained and the fright experienced. 3 Simply because damages are
speculative and will possibly open the door to fictitious claims should not
prohibit those with legitimate claims from proving their case." The fears
of increased litigation should not cause the courts to shirk their responsibil-
ities,15 and it has not been established that these fears have materialized
Accord, DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
12. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219-20 (1973). This is the position
taken by the great weight of authority. 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance
§ 36 & n.16 (1968). California has dissented in this area and has permitted recovery to a
mother who witnessed the death of her child, notwithstanding the fact that she was in a
complete zone of safety, on the basis that the resulting injuries were reasonably foreseeable
by the defendant. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). This
approach has not been followed in other jurisdictions and was expressly rejected in Jelley v.
LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); and Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259
A.2d 12 (1969).
It seems sufficiently obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child
may be both a real and serious injury. All ordinary human feelings are in favor of her
action against the negligent defendant. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971).
13. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 33, 197 S.E.2d 214, 218. Accord, Purcell v. St. Paul Ry.,
48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203
N.W. 643 (1925); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907); Smith, Relation
of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rzv. 193,
212-26 (1944). The argument that physical consequences are too remote was cleverly coun-
tered in Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, where it was noted that remoteness as
applied in tort law is not a matter of time. If this were the case then a person who adminis-
tered a slow acting poison would not have proximately caused the death, because the victim
may not die for several hours. Id. at 677-78.
14. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 33, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973). The fear of vexatious suits
and fictitious claims is considered to be the most valid objection to recovery:
Whatever justification there may be rests in the courts' fear that unscrupulous lawyers
with the aid of equally unscrupulous doctors may obtain from sympathetic juries
verdicts upon purely fabricated evidence. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 725, 733 (1937).
15. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 33, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973). See Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939):
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
"flood of litigation"; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much work
to do. Id. at 877.
Contra, Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896).
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in those jurisdictions which do not require impact." The weight of author-
ity supported the court's conclusion that the reasons for the existence of
the "impact rule" are no longer logical,1 7 and research revealed that since
1929 every jurisdiction that has considered the rule, except one,' has either
rejected or abrogated the "impact rule."' 9
Apparently relying on two of the traditional arguments,Justice Harrison
in his dissent was of the opinion that the Hughes case demonstrated the
wisdom of the "impact rule," and that Virginia should neither modify nor
abrogate the rule.20 He was not convinced that there was a clear causal
connection between the plaintiff's physical injuries and defendant's auto-
mobile striking her porch.2 Furthermore, he believed that the damages
were excessive since her medical bills totaled only $112, while her recovery
was $12,000.22
While the Hughes ruling eliminated the necessity for a contemporaneous
physical impact when "physical injuries" naturally result from fright or
shock, impact is still a prerequisite where conduct is merely negligent and
the resulting harm is emotional disturbance alone.2? It becomes necessary
to examine the requirement of "physical injury" to fully understand the
16. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 33, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973).
17. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. The court noted that, "[m]any eminent scholars have
considered the rule and are virtually unanimous in condemning it as unjust and contrary to
experience and logic." Id. at 33, 197 S.E.2d at 219. See McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort
Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 1, 31 (1949); Smith, Relation of Emotions to
Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 197-98 (1944);
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 274-79 (1921).
18. Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972). The majority opinion
stated that they did not feel that Schurk was a proper case for reconsideration of the "impact
rule" and that they would reconsider the rule in a proper case. Id. at 939-40.
19. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973). See also Comment,
Injuries from Fright Without Contact, 15 CLv.-MAR. L. REv. 331, 337 (1966).
20. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 36, 197 S.E.2d 214, 221 (1973).
21. Id. at 37, 197 S.E.2d at 221. Justice Harrison is apparently relying on the argument
that damages unaccompanied by a physical impact can not be considered as a natural result
of the negligent conduct.
22. Id. Justice Harrison is apparently relying on the argument that damages are too specu-
lative in nature and will open the door to fictitious claims. The majority in Hughes addressed
itself to the problem of damages in the following fashion:
There is no fixed rule or standard by which damages can be measurd for mental and
physical suffering. The amount to be awarded is largely a question for the jury to
determine in view of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Unless the
amount of the award is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court, and to
create the impression that the jury was influenced by partiality or prejudice, the
verdict of the jury will not be disturbed by us. Id. at 36, 197 S.E.2d at 220.
23. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219:
[W]here conduct is merely negligent, not wilful, wanton, or vindictive, and physical
impact is lacking, there can be no recovery for emotional disturbance alone.
1974]
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Hughes ruling. The plaintiff's condition was described as "anxiety reac-
tion, with phobia and hysteria," which "presented a serious mental prob-
lem."24 It is implicit from the facts and holding that "physical injuries"
includes mental conditions. This appears to be in line with an earlier
federal case applying Virginia law,n in which the court stated that "physi-
cal injury" is not to be interpreted in the usual sense. What is required is
a suffering of greater substance than a pure isolated mental anguish, such
as fright, anxiety, or apprehension, 26 which is generally trivial, of short
duration and easily feigned." This approach appears to be the prevailing
one in other jurisdictions 8 and appears to be a requirement intended to
provide the court with an objective standard by which the injury may be
properly ascertained. 29
As a result of the Hughes decision, Virginia now allows recovery for"physical injuries" naturally resulting from shock or fear proximately
caused by negligent conduct, notwithstanding the absence of a contempor-
aneous physical impact. While recovery is not permitted for emotional
disturbance alone without a contemporaneous physical impact, it is sub-
mitted that under the liberal interpretation of "physical injury" very few,
if any, deserving cases will go without redress. Finally, the limitations
imposed by the court seem to be based on foreseeability. The third party
who witnesses negligent conduct resulting in injury to another exemplifies
the "unforeseeable plaintiff' 3 and a fortiori when they are not a member
of the immediate family. When the resulting harm would not have oc-
24. Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216.
25. Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960).
26. Id. at 949.
"Physical damage" .. has never been equated by the Virginia courts with physical
taction. The term here connotes merely an injury upon or within the person of the
claimant. Furthermore, the injury may be direct or indirect, mediate or immediate.
But there must be a suffering of greater substance than a pure, isolated mental an-
guish, such as fright, anxiety or apprehensiveness.
27. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 54, at 329 (4th ed. 1971).
28. Accord, Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906) (psychopathological condi-
tions were properly regarded as "physical injury"); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165
A. 182, 184 (1933) ("physical injuries" refers to an external condition or symptoms clearly
indicating a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state.); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900) ("Traumatic Neurasthenia"; described as a serious
nervous condition, was properly regarded as a "physical injury."); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex.
210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890) (psychopathological conditions were properly regarded as "physical
injury.")
29. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959). For all practical purposes the question is not whether
the consequence is physical, but is it objectively ascertainable? Id. at § 9(b) & n.7.
30. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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curred in a normal individual, it becomes an unforeseeable risk, thereby
limiting the defendant's liability.3 '
J.H.H.
31. For an exhaustive survey of this area of the law see Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Smith, Relation of Emotions
to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944).
